Abstract: Collective bargaining in Germany takes place at either industry or firm level. Collective bargaining coverage is much higher than union density. The share of employees covered by collective bargaining in a single firm can vary between 0% and 100%. This institutional setup suggests that researchers should explicitly distinguish union density, coverage rate at the firm level, and coverage at the individual level. Using linked employeremployee data, we estimate OLS and quantile regressions of wages on these dimensions of union influence. A higher share of employees in a firm covered by industry-wide or firm-specific contracts is associated with higher wages, but there is no clear-cut effect on wage dispersion. Yet, holding coverage at the firm level constant, individual bargaining coverage is associated with a lower wage level and less wage dispersion. A higher union density reinforces the effects of coverage, but the effect of union density is negative at all points of the wage distribution for employees who work in firms without coverage by collective bargaining. Higher union density thus compresses the wage distribution while moving the distribution in firms without coverage uniformly leftwards.
Introduction
"Union coverage should not be considered a natural extension of union membership [...] OECD (2004, p. 147) The impact of wage setting institutions on labor market performance is a recurring key issue in policy debates (OECD 1994 (OECD , 2004 (OECD , 2006 . It is often argued that less rigid wage setting institutions allow for greater wage flexibility, which-in face of asymmetric shocks-is a necessary ingredient for a well functioning labor market. Wage bargaining institutions differ strongly across OECD countries, with pronounced cross-country differences in the share of employees covered by collective bargaining (coverage rate) and in the share of union members among employees (union density) (OECD 2004) . Under firm-specific bargaining-the prevailing institutional setup in the U.S. and a small number of other OECD countries-coverage by collective bargaining and union density basically coincide in the private sector. In contrast, in many European countries, there exists centralized wage bargaining (mostly at the sectoral level) between unions and employers' associations, and the coverage rate among employees is typically higher than union density.
1
Germany is a key case where coverage exceeds union density largely because of contract recognitions by employers, which are voluntary in a legal sense. However, in recognizing collective bargaining agreements, firms do respond to the demands and the bargaining power of employees. In fact, three distinct wage bargaining regimes coexist. First, a large share of employees is covered by sectoral wage bargaining agreements (henceforth denoted as sectoral contracts, SC), which are based on centralized negotiations at the 1 OECD (2004, Chart 3.4) reports that coverage exceeds union density by more than 10 percentage points for 17 OECD countries and by more than 20 percentage points for 12 OECD countries. industry level. Employers covered by a sectoral agreement may pay higher wages than the contract wage according to the favorability principle (OECD 2004, p. 154) . This results in a wage cushion or a wage drift.
2 The first regime also includes extensions of sectoral agreements by the government to an entire industry.
3 Second, a smaller share of employees is covered by firm-level agreements, which are specific to employees in one firm (henceforth denoted as firm-specific contracts, FC). Firm-specific bargaining and sectoral bargaining are mutually exclusive alternatives in Germany, i. e. firm-specific bargaining is not a second round of bargaining supplementing a sectoral agreement. 4 The third wage bargaining regime involves those employees who are not covered by collective wage bargaining at all (henceforth denoted as individual wage contracts, IC). The uncovered sector has grown in recent decades (OECD 2004, p. 154 ).
According to the German Collective Bargaining Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz), collectively negotiated agreements are necessarily binding for a specific job match if the firm is a member of an employer association and the worker is a union member. However, the scope of collective agreements, in particular the scope of sectoral wage agreements, goes beyond organized parties. Not only do negotiation outcomes cover union members, but employers often recognize collective bargaining outcomes for most of their employees without ex ante legal obligation. Moreover, collectively negotiated agreements must not dictate individual wage premia for union members (compared to non-members) due to the freedom not to associate as a principle of the German constitution (negative Koalitionsfreiheit).
Uncovered employees may work either in uncovered firms exhibiting a coverage rate of 0%, i. e. with no covered employees at all, or in firms with a positive coverage rate comprising both covered and uncovered employees. Put differently, while a single employee belongs to only one of the three distinct bargaining regimes, the employee's firm may be covered by either sectoral or firm-specific bargaining-meaning that the firm has a positive coverage rate-and it may also employ uncovered employees. Typically, the majority of 2 A wage cushion is also observed in other European countries (see, e. g., Cardoso and Portugal 2005) .
3 Contract extensions by the government have played only a negligible role until recently. Less than 1% of all employees are covered in the early 2000s due to such contract extensions (BMWA 2004) . 4 In Spain, for instance, firm-specific bargaining is a second round of bargaining (Card and de la Rica 2006). employees is covered by collective bargaining in firms with a positive coverage rate. On the one hand, uncovered employees in a firm with positive coverage may be paid less than covered employees when the firm uses non-coverage as an instrument for downward wage flexibility. For example, the firm may cease to recognize a collective agreement for newly hired employees while the incumbent workforce remains covered for a while. On the other hand, uncovered employees in a firm with positive coverage may be paid more than covered employees when the firm wants to pay higher wages to highly productive employees, possibly using more flexible payment schemes.
The related literature implies that collective bargaining is associated with higher wage levels and lower wage dispersion (Pencavel 1991 , Card 1996 , Addison and Schnabel 2003 .
Card and de la Rica (2006) argue that firm-specific bargaining allows employees with a strong bargaining position (e. g., due to high levels of specific human capital) to seize higher rents compared to more centralized forms of collective bargaining (see Hartog et al. 2002 for a contrary view).
Empirical studies typically take union membership and union recognition or collective bargaining coverage as mere alternatives to measure union effects (Lewis 1986 , OECD 2004 . Studies for Germany have so far been confined to using either collective bargaining coverage (Stephan and Gerlach 2003 , Gürtzgen 2009a or union density (Fitzenberger and Kohn 2005) . We emphasize that union density and coverage (union recognition) are more than just two different indicators of collective bargaining in Germany. Union density reflects the bargaining power of unions. It is likely to have a positive effect both on wages in the covered sector and on coverage rates. Coverage rates and wages in the covered sector may also affect wage outcomes in the uncovered sector (Pencavel 1991, chapter 6) . The direction of these effects is ambiguous (Kahn 1978, Neumark and Wachter 1995) . On the one hand, the threat effect implies that wages increase in the uncovered sector in response to higher coverage rates or to higher wages in the covered sector because uncovered firms want to discourage coverage. On the other hand, the crowding effect presumes that wage increases in the covered sector or increases in the coverage rates lower employment in the covered sector. For uncovered firms, this raises relative labor supply, resulting in downward pressure on wages in a competitive labor market.
Our paper scrutinizes the effects of union density and of collective bargaining coverage on the distribution of wages both in the covered and the uncovered sector. We argue that, on the one hand, union density is a proxy for union power and therefore influences the bargaining outcome in the covered sector. Collective bargaining coverage, on the other hand, captures the actual application of bargaining agreements. Moreover, our empirical analysis accounts for the likely interaction between union density and coverage as well as for spillover effects of union density on the uncovered sector.
Our contribution to the literature is fourfold: First, there is only a small international literature which accounts for differential wage effects of union density and coverage in the covered sector, and no such study has yet been conducted for Germany. Our paper is the first to distinguish simultaneously (i) coverage by a firm-specific collective agreement (FC) versus coverage by a sector-wide collective agreement (SC), (ii) firm-level coverage measured by the share of covered employees in the firm versus coverage of individual workers, and (iii) union density. We estimate the wage effects of both coverage and union density, also accounting for the effect of union density on the uncovered sector. Second, we use a unique linked employer-employee dataset, the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES) 2001, which records precisely the coverage status of individual employees, but which does not include information on union membership. Third, we impute union density for homogeneously defined labor market segments based on estimated membership equations in Fitzenberger et al. (2011) . As a limitation, we acknowledge that we ignore the estimation error in the imputation. Fourth, we provide both OLS and quantile regression estimates in order to estimate impacts on wage levels and on wage dispersion. As a methodological contribution, we suggest a modification of the approach taken by Angrist et al. (2006) for estimating a weighted quantile regression with clustered standard errors.
Our empirical results show a positive effect of the share of employees in a firm covered by either industry-wide or firm-specific contracts on the level of wages in the firm. At the same time, holding the share of covered employees in the firm constant, uncovered employees earn higher wages than covered employees in the same firm and this gap increases along the wage distribution. A higher union density is associated with higher wages for covered employees. Both coverage and higher union density are associated with lower wage dispersion among covered employees. The effects of union density on the wage level and on wage dispersion in the sector of uncovered firms are negative. This suggests a dominance of the crowding effect over the threat effect. But, at the same time, the threat effect may be responsible for mitigating the negative wage effect in the lower part of the wage distribution. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that unions increase wage levels and decrease wage dispersion among covered employees, and that negative crowding effects dominate in the uncovered sector.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature on union wage effects. The dataset used in our analysis is described in Section 3, which also provides some descriptive evidence. Section 4 presents the econometric approach and discusses the estimation results, and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix provides details about the econometric approach and about the data used. An additional online appendix (available at www.empiwifo.uni-freiburg.de/discussion-papers-1) includes further detailed information and results.
Background and Literature Review
We first provide a short overview of the related literature on wage effects of collective bargaining and then discuss specifically the effects of union density and bargaining coverage.
Bargaining models treat the negotiation of wages in the covered sector as a rent-sharing problem, the solution to which depends upon the bargaining power of the negotiating parties (e. g., in Nash bargaining). Unions bargain for a higher wage level for the work force they represent. The monopoly union model, the right-to-manage model, or the efficient bargaining model predict a positive relationship between union power and the level of wages (Farber 1986 , Oswald 1985 , Pencavel 1991 , Naylor 2003 . Union density, i. e. the share of employed union members among all employees, is a measure of union power in Germany (Fitzenberger and Kohn 2005) .
5 The higher the number of union members paying membership fees are, the higher is the union's funding for union action (e. g., paying strike benefits). Financial funding and union representation at the shop floor increase individual support for union action, which raises the ability to undertake a strike and the possible damage inflicted upon employers in case of a strike.
Some studies incorporate effects of collective bargaining on aspects of the entire wage distribution (see Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2003) for a survey of the empirical evidence on unions and wage inequality). Agell and Lommerud (1992) and Burda (1995) argue that risk averse employees have a preference for wage compression. Unions as agents of employees may be willing to trade off a lower average wage against less wage inequality. If the earnings of employees depend upon different states of nature such as demand shocks on firms' product market, a union will bargain for a compression of the wage distribution relative to the productivity distribution (Guiso et al. 2005) . A compression effect is also consistent with search and matching theories (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999) . By enforcing 'equal pay for equal work', a union additionally seeks to limit favoritism and discrimination by superiors and colleagues and to encourage solidarity among the work force (Freeman 1982) . These arguments predict a negative relationship between union power and wage dispersion.
German collective agreements do not constrain a firm's right to pay premia above the wage set in the collective contract (this reflects the favorability principle) such that the actual wage may exceed the contractual wage. Cardoso and Portugal (2005) refer to this gap as the wage cushion in order to distinguish it from the wage drift (the change of the gap). They find that the positive effect of union strength-as measured by the share of covered employees-on the level of contractual wages is partly offset by a smaller wage cushion. As in Card and de la Rica (2006) , firms covered by (multi-or single-) firm-specific 5 The German literature refers to the share of employed union members among all employees as net union density in order to distinguish this measure from the ratio of all union members (employed or non-employed) to the number of employees (gross union density). agreements pay higher wages than firms covered by industry-wide agreements.
In line with the existence of a wage cushion, the impact of collective bargaining is likely to vary along the wage distribution. If contractual wages serve as wage floors, the wage distribution is compressed from below. Büttner and Fitzenberger (2003) assume that efficiency wages are paid in the upper part of the productivity distribution, whereas contractual wages above productivity are binding for less productive employees. Then, a more powerful union will bargain for a stronger compression of the wage distribution from below.
The effects of different bargaining regimes are likely to interact with country-specific institutions and social norms (Flanagan 1999). Card and de la Rica (2006) find that firmspecific bargaining in Spain results in higher wages compared to wages set in regional and national contracts, while Hartog et al. (2002) report only minor differences between bargaining regimes in the Netherlands. Analyzing union wage effects in Italy, Dell'Aringa and Lucifora (1994) find a positive effect of recognition and a negative effect of plant-level union density.
The literature typically takes union membership and union recognition or collective bargaining coverage as mere alternatives to measure union effects (Lewis 1986 , OECD 2004 .
6 Differential wage effects of coverage and union density may arise from spillover effects between the covered and the uncovered sector (Kahn 1978 , chapter 6 of Pencavel 1991 , Neumark and Wachter 1995 . 7 On the one hand, a positive relationship between wages in the covered sector (and thus coverage rate or union density) and wages in the uncovered sector arises because wage outcomes in the covered sector are taken as a reference point in the uncovered sector, possibly in order to avoid coverage (threat effect). 8 On the other hand, a negative relationship between wages in the covered sector (and thus coverage rate and union density) and wages in the uncovered sector may exist because excess labor supply from the covered sector exerts pressure on the wage level in the uncovered sector (crowding effect). The latter effect may be reinforced by a decline of investment in the uncovered sector when union density increases (Vogel 2007) . The empirical evidence for the U.S. is ambiguous. Using union density as measure of unionism, Kahn (1978) finds that the crowding effect dominates the threat effect, while Neumark and Wachter (1995) confirm this result at the industry level but not at the city level.
Coverage by collective wage bargaining in Germany is a firm decision, which is voluntary in an ex ante legal sense. When recognizing sectoral collective bargaining agreements or when engaging in firm-specific bargaining, firms do respond to the demands of their employees and to the bargaining power of unions as employees' representatives. When firms decide to quit a collective bargaining agreement after it has expired, the agreement remains binding for the incumbent covered workforce for a while, and during that time, the firm can only deviate from the collective agreement for new hirings. In our empirical analysis, we conceptualize union power by union density in labor market segments defined by region, employee characteristics, and firm characteristics, and we argue that union density in a labor market segment has a positive impact on coverage. While the freedom not to associate forbids collective bargaining agreements dictating individual wage premia for union members in comparison to non-members, wages set at the firm level and at the individual level take collective bargaining outcomes as a reference point, be it in order to reduce transactions costs, to prevent employees from joining a union (threat effect), to elicit higher effort by employees (Pencavel 1991, Chapter 6. 3), or to commit to a minimum wage level in order to incentivize training effort (Dustmann and Schönberg 2009). As a result, coverage is considerably higher than union density (Schnabel 2005) .
Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES, -und Lohnstrukturerhebung) for the year 2001. We restrict our analysis to West Germany. 
Gehalts

German Structure of Earnings Survey 2001
The GSES is a cross-sectional linked employer-employee dataset containing about 850,000 employees in some 22,000 firms. While mainly omitting the public sector, the GSES covers the major part of industry and private services. There are several advantages of using the GSES 2001. It is one of the largest mandatory firm-level surveys available for Germany.
Therefore, the data are more reliable than individual-level surveys or data collected without reporting obligation (Jacobebbinghaus 2002 ). The GSES not only includes workers in regular employment, but also employees in vocational training, marginal employment, or partial retirement schemes. In the GSES 2001, wages are neither truncated nor censored such that the lower and the upper parts of the wage distribution can be analyzed precisely. Most importantly, the GSES provides not only firm-level information on bargaining coverage, but also the coverage status for each individual worker.
The GSES 2001 has rarely been used in the literature. Until recently, analyses with GSES data have been restricted to administrative use or to regional subsamples (Stephan and Gerlach (2003) , Gerlach and Stephan (2006) , Heinbach and Spindler (2007) ). For extensive descriptions of the dataset see Hafner (2005) , Hafner and Lenz (2008) , and Statistisches Bundesamt (2000 Bundesamt ( , 2004 . We use the on-site-use version of the GSES available at the Research Data Center of the statistical offices of the federal states (Länder)
9 The reasons for this decision are as follows. First, the labor market in East Germany is still affected by the transition following the German unification. Second, union policy in East Germany is strongly oriented towards catching up to West German standards. Third, union action in East Germany relies on support by West German unions. Thus, it is unlikely that East German unions act independently. To give an example: When the metal workers' union went on strike in the year 2003 in East Germany to achieve the equalization of standard hours of work, the union had to rely on support from West Germany to fill their ranks (see the newspaper DIE WELT dated June 23, 2003) . By the time the strike affected West German firms, this support declined quickly, and the strike was discontinued without success.
in Wiesbaden. Details on our selection of data are provided in Appendix B. We focus on prime-age male employees working full-time and analyze hourly wages for both blue-collar and white-collar workers. Our analysis controls for differences between the two groups of employees, and it excludes white-collar workers in upper and middle management positions who would be paid without reference to the system of collective wage setting.
Definitions and summary statistics of the full set of variables used in our analysis are reported in the additional online appendix.
Imputation of Union Density
The GSES does not provide information on union membership. We therefore extend the dataset by imputing union density as follows. In a first step, we project individual propensities for union membership for the observations in our sample based on the estimates in 
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In a second step, union density (UD) in a homogenous labor market segment is obtained by aggregating individual membership propensities in cells defined by region (7 states) × industry (30 sectors) × skill (4 groups defined by educational attainment) × age (7 five-year brackets), 11 yielding a total of 5,841 non-empty cells, denoted as labor market segments. The imputed UD is the same for all employees in a labor market segment, and we do not distinguish UD by type of bargaining because within a labor market segment it would be the same union which engages both in sectoral and firm-specific bargaining.
The above definition of labor market segments reflects the structure of the German 10 The projection is based on model specification (E) in the working paper Fitzenberger et al. (2006) . This specification uses only explanatory variables which are available in both the GSES and the GSOEP. The variables used involve age, gender, educational attainment, employment status (white collar workers, blue collar workers, civil servants; part-timers vs. full-timers), earnings, tenure, firm size, industry, and a set of time dummies. The empirical model is estimated separately for West Germany and East Germany. The imputations for the purpose of this paper are based on estimates for West Germany.
11 The highest age bracket contains only 55-year-old employees.
wage bargaining system. The regional dimension and the sector classification account for the fact that collective negotiations take place at the industry level in different bargaining regions. The fact that collective agreements further distinguish various wage groups is captured by the two dimensions skill and age. The aggregation for the labor market segments enables us to analyze the effect of union power independent of individual membership. In the German context, it would make little sense to estimate wage effects of individual membership because collectively negotiated premia for union members are forbidden and coverage is a firm decision. This decision depends upon union power, which we proxy by UD, in a labor market segment. Hence, even if individual membership were available in the data, we would continue to use an aggregate measure of UD.
Descriptive Evidence
We focus on male employees (both blue-and white-collar) in West Germany (excluding Berlin) and distinguish the following three regimes of bargaining coverage:
(SC) sectoral collective contract negotiated between an employers' association and a union, (FC) firm-specific contract negotiated between a single firm and representatives of its employees (typically a union), and (IC) individual contract negotiated between employee and employer.
The first column of Table 1 displays the size of the respective regimes in our GSES sample. The numbers are broadly in line with the literature cited above, accounting for differences in the datasets used. 57% of West German employees are paid according to sectoral collective contracts, henceforth called sectoral contracts. With another 8%
covered by firm-specific contracts, this leaves about a third with individual contracts.
- Table 1 about here -
The share of covered employees within firms follows a bimodal distribution ( Figure 1 ).
About 40% of firms in the sample do not apply any sectoral or firm-specific contracts at all. In another 7% of firms, all employees are covered. This leaves more than one half of all firms with partial coverage. This fact enables us to distinguish coverage effects at the individual level and at the firm level. Typically, the majority of employees is covered in firms with a positive share of covered employees.
- Figure 1 about hereColumns two and three of Table 1 concern log hourly wages by wage-setting regimes.
On average, employees with individual contracts earn the lowest wages (2.783). Wages paid according to a sectoral collective agreement are markedly higher (2.818), and the highest wages are paid by firms subject to a firm-specific contract (2.852). Wage dispersion as measured by the standard deviation of log hourly wages is lowest among employees under sectoral coverage (0.284) and only slightly higher in case of firm-specific contracts (0.315). Employees with individually negotiated wages face a considerably higher standard deviation (0.412).
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Across the 5,841 labor market segments (cells) in our data, the average imputed union density UD is 18.5%. Weighted by cell employment, the weighted average of UD is 22.4%.
Note that UD is not identical for all employees in a firm. UD is markedly lower than collective bargaining coverage. Again, the numbers are in accordance with the literature.
Econometric Investigation
The literature and the discussion in the previous sections suggest that both coverage by collective bargaining and a higher union density are associated with lower wage dispersion.
Coverage is also associated with higher wage levels while the link between union density and the wage level is ambiguous. Sectoral collective contracts may be associated with lower wage inequality than firm-specific contracts.
Observed differences in wage levels and in wage dispersion are not necessarily caused by 12 More detailed evidence on the wage distributions of different groups of employees (men, women working full-time, and women working part-time, separate for blue-collar and white-collar workers in East and West German firms) is provided by Kohn and Lembcke (2007) . the prevalence of different bargaining regimes. First, they may conceal differences in union power between different labor market segments. Second, they may result from underlying heterogeneity in employee or firm characteristics. We investigate both of these issues by means of OLS and quantile wage regressions. Our analysis distinguishes: (i) coverage by a sectoral collective contract versus coverage by a firm-specific collective contract, (ii) extent of coverage at the firm level versus coverage of individual workers, and (iii) union density. Moreover, we carefully analyze interaction effects between the different measures.
As a caveat, our analysis does not take account of the estimation error in union density. 
OLS Wage Regressions
We analyze the different channels of union impact on the wage level by means of wage regressions with individual and firm controls. Log hourly wages (log(w)) are regressed Allowing for interaction effects between the variables from different levels, a benchmark 13 Note that union density is calculated as an average in a labor market segment, which is likely to reduce somewhat the imputation error.
14 SHARE SC is the average of the dummy variable SC within the firm and SHARE FC is the average of the dummy variable FC within the firm. The large number of firms with SHARE SC or SHARE FC lying between 0% and 100% (see Figure 1) identify the coefficients. specification can be written as
where β V 1 to β V 5 measure base effects, β V 6 and β V 7 capture the different nature of individual coverage in high-coverage firms as compared to low-coverage firms, and β V 8 and β V 9 allow for the possibility that UD (power) effects differ by coverage. The specification allows us to test whether UD only affects covered employees or both covered and uncovered employees. Positive values of β V 10 and β V 11 indicate that strong unions achieve their wage objective most successfully in high-coverage firms. full coverage are higher on average than wages in uncovered firms.
- Table 2 about hereSpecification (iv) additionally allows for interaction effects, which turn out negative.
Thus, the effect of individual coverage is particularly negative in firms with a high share of workers covered by a sectoral contract. However, this result does not hold for firmspecific contracts as the effect of FC×SHARE FC is small and insignificant. Average partial effects for individual coverage remain negative. For example, the marginal effect for individual coverage by a sectoral contract, evaluated at the average coverage rate of 0.565, is -10.1%. 15 In the following, unless stated otherwise, marginal effects are evaluated as average partial effects (APEs) at the respective average coverage shares. An employee in a firm with an average rate of collective coverage earns about 10% less than an uncovered employee in the same firm. In turn, the marginal effect of an increase in the share of covered employees differs between covered and uncovered employees. While both effects are positive, the effect for covered employees is reduced by the interaction term. In combination, the marginal effect for covered employees is a 0.8% wage increase for a 10 percentage points increase in the share of employees covered by a sectoral contract, while the wage increase is 1.8% for uncovered employees.
Specifications (v) to (viii) introduce UD into the regressions. The base effect of UD has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level in all specifications. 16 Moreover, the inclusion of UD basically does not alter the effects of coverage. Merely the coefficients of SC and FC become slightly more pronounced. Again, we generally find a positive effect of collective coverage at the firm level, but negative effects of individual coverage.
In specification (v), the UD effect picks up the effects of the omitted coverage variables.
When coverage effects are included in specification (vi), a 10 percentage points increase in UD is associated with a decline in wages of about 1%. Therefore, unions either put only a small weight on the wage-level objective, or they are not very effective in using their power to increase wages. Specification (vii), which additionally allows for interaction effects between UD and individual coverage, shows a corresponding decline of about 3%
for employees with individual contracts. The positive interaction effects then imply a reduction of only 1% for employees covered by a sectoral contract, and even a small wageincreasing effect of UD in case of firm-specific contracts. This means that stronger unions achieve higher wages for covered employees only in the case of firm-specific bargaining.
The inclusion of interaction terms between UD and the coverage shares in specification (viii) does not show any significant coefficients. Therefore, we resort to specification (vii)
as our preferred specification for further analysis. Column (iii) of Table 3 The APE of UD is also negative. This result suggests that the crowding effect from the covered sector to the uncovered sector dominates the threat effect. Alternatively, it would also be consistent with the argument that firms in segments with strong unions invest less in capital (Vogel 2007) . One may be concerned that the negative effect of UD may reflect a reverse causality such that employees expecting low wages may join a union to win 17 The APE of, say, SC is calculated as AP E =β SC +β SC×SHARESC · SHARESC +β U D×SC · U D. Since we distinguish differential impacts of, e. g., UD for covered and uncovered employees, we cannot restrict our attention to APEs only.
18 Note that our estimates control for a large set of individual and firm characteristics, including firmsize and professional status (see the additional online appendix). Of course, we cannot fully exclude the possibility of selection effects based on unobserved differences. additional protection. We cannot rule out such an effect. However, it is unlikely that this effect dominates because it could not explain the positive interaction effect between UD and coverage (Table 2, specification (vii)), as discussed above) implying that stronger unions are associated with a higher wage gap between covered and uncovered employees.
This interaction effect is inconsistent with UD merely reflecting low wage prospects. Note that UD varies only by labor market segments, i.e. a possible selection effect would not operate via individual wage prospects, and UD is the same among covered and uncovered employees in a labor market segment. As we discuss below (Table 3 , specification (iv)), the aforementioned interaction effects are very similar when UD is replaced by fixed effects for each labor market segment.
In order to test the sensitivity of our preferred specification with respect to the set of included covariates, Table 3 (v) worker and firm characteristics as in (iii), but the analysis restricted to larger labor market segments (cells with more than 18 employees in our sample).
By changing the set of conditioning variables, we can assess the effect of selection into different wage bargaining regimes and into different levels of UD with regard to differences in observable characteristics (Card and de la Rica 2006). Selection effects involve both types of firms and types of employees. Although our analysis cannot use a convincing research design allowing for the estimation of causal effects, one may suspect that selection on unobservables works in a similar way as the selection on observables.
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- Table 3 about hereControlling for both individual and firm characteristics notably reduces the effects of both coverage and UD. This way, we control in a cross-sectional wage regression for some of the likely endogeneity in UD and coverage. For example, the APE of SC is -9% in specification (iii), while it would be -20% in specification (i). For covered employees, the partial effect of SHARE SC even changes sign. While a higher share of covered employees is associated with a higher wage in specification (iii) the effect is negative in specification (i). The effect of UD also changes sign between specifications (ii) and (iii). The latter result suggests that the direction of selection into UD differs regarding individual and firm characteristics. On the one hand, controlling for individual characteristics increases the estimated UD coefficients. UD is negatively correlated with individual characteristics that tend to be associated with higher wages, i.e. unions tend to represent workers with lower wages. On the other hand, controlling for firm characteristics reduces the estimated UD coefficients. UD is positively correlated with firm characteristics that tend to be associated with higher wages. The motivation to unionize is larger when there are rents that can be extracted from successful firms, which tend to pay higher wages.
The findings of the sensitivity analysis highlight the importance of controlling for individual as well as for firm characteristics to account for the selection effects based on observables. Therefore, we only report results of specifications controlling for both individual and firm characteristics for the quantile regressions in Section 4.2 below.
Specifications (iv) and (v) serve as additional robustness checks regarding the fact that UD is an estimated quantity. 21 Specification (iv) replaces UD by dummy variables 20 Note that specification (iii) in Table 3 shows an R 2 of 71%, i. e., the observable variables in our linked employer-employee data explain a fairly high share of the variation in wages. Thus, unobservables are less important than it is typically the case in wage regressions. 21 We are grateful to a referee who suggested these specifications as robustness checks. Further robust-for the 5,841 labor market segments with variation in UD. Otherwise, the specification is the same as in (iii). Again using specification (iii), (v) restricts the analysis to cells with more than 18 employees in our sample, omitting the smallest 50% of all cells. This check is reasonable because UD may involve a higher estimation error for smaller cells.
Specifications (iv) and (v) show very similar coefficient estimates (and APEs) compared to specification (iii), and none of the substantive results change. We thus conclude that our estimates are unlikely to be affected substantially by the fact that UD is an estimated covariate.
Quantile Regression Results
Least squares regressions focus on explaining conditional average wages (the wage level)
only. Still, collective bargaining is likely to affect the entire conditional distribution of wages as well, e. g., because unions have egalitarian objectives and union action is targeted specifically towards low-wage earners. Uncovered employees working in covered firms may receive particularly low wages when firms use this instrument to hire cheap labor (e. g. after leaving an employers' association) but all incumbent workers stay covered by persisting collective bargaining contracts. Alternatively, uncovered employees working in firms also employing covered employees may receive higher wages when firms use this instrument to pay some highly productive employees particularly high wages without having to follow a collective contract (e. g. because these employees take management responsibilities in their firms). Possibly, such employees earn a risk premium. In contrast to workers paid a wage cushion, for whom the contract wage provides an effective minimum wage, such high-wage workers cannot rely on contract wages as a fall back position. These arguments suggest that wage bargaining and UD also affect wage dispersion, implying different partial effects at different quantiles of the conditional wage distribution.
For these reasons, we estimate quantile regressions. Analogous to the OLS regressions discussed in the preceding section, we employ sampling weights, and the inference has to ness checks similar to specification (v) can be found in the additional online appendix. 
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These non-clustered but heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors tend to be much smaller (see Table 6 in the additional online appendix). Table 4 reports quantile regression results for our preferred specification. Again, the upper panel reports regression coefficients and the lower panel the corresponding APEs.
In general, effects at the median are close to those obtained from least squares estimation, and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant.
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- Table 4 about here -
The effects of both coverage shares at the firm level (SHARE SC and SHARE FC) do not change much across the distribution. Therefore, a firm's decision to apply a sectoral or a firm-specific contract increases wages across the entire distribution in a similar way, compared to a situation of no coverage by collective bargaining. The negative impact of individual coverage is stronger at the top of the conditional distribution. While the APE of a sectoral contract is -6% at the 10th percentile, it becomes stronger decreasing to -12% at the 90th percentile. Therefore, coverage by a sectoral contract reduces wage inequality at the individual level. The adoption of a sectoral contract is in fact a means to 22 So far, the approach is not standard in econometric software packages such as STATA, the software employed in this paper. Bootstrapping as an alternative way to estimate V AR(β(τ )) is not feasible due to computational constraints at the Research Data Center. 23 We are grateful to a referee who suggested this check. 24 Only the interaction FC×SHARE FC is insignificant at all quantiles, as in the OLS regression.
reduce 'unjustified' pay gaps among employees with the same observable characteristics.
This may in turn encourage solidarity among the workforce. Since the coverage effect is also negative at the bottom of the wage distribution, there is no evidence for a negative selection out of collective coverage in this part of the distribution. The effect of firmspecific contracts on individual wage dispersion is also negative, but not as pronounced as that of sectoral contracts. Incidently, comparing wages under firm-specific wage contracts with those in uncovered firms (shares of covered employees are zero) shows that this gap is largest around the median. Table 5 illustrates the effects of individual coverage. We display differences in predicted log wages between a covered and an uncovered employee in the same firm, evaluated at mean covariates and for different combinations of UD and shares of covered employees within the firm. 25 At each of the displayed quantiles, we compare employees in a labor market segment with high union density (UD=37%) versus low union density (UD=10%), and firms with high coverage rate (SHARE=95%) versus low coverage rate (SHARE=50%). For both sectoral contracts (SC, panel A) and firm-specific contracts (FC, panel B), the effects are always negative. The gap is lower when union density is higher. The wage gap is also lower in firms with a higher share of covered employees.
Compared to the effects of sectoral coverage, the effect of being covered in a firm with a firm-specific contract is more pronounced when the share of covered employees is high.
In all cases, the gap increases along the conditional wage distribution.
- Table 5 about here -
The impact of UD also changes strongly across the wage distribution. The negative base effect is strongest at the upper end of the distribution. Yet, the positive interaction effects of UD and the coverage regimes SC and FC also increase throughout the distribution. Consequently, the differences in the impact of union power on covered and uncovered employees are strongest at the top of the distribution. The APE of UD indicates that, 25 We thank a referee for the suggestion to summarize wage differences for some representative scenarios.
on average, a 10 percentage points increase in union density shows no significant effect at the 10th percentile, but a significant reduction of 2.4% at the 90th percentile. Thus, a higher UD reduces wage inequality, which is in line with the preference of unions for less wage inequality. However, our finding cannot be solely attributed to unions' egalitarian policy because this would also imply positive wage effects in the lower part of the wage distribution, even if the unions were willing to accept a lower mean wage. Instead, the uniformly negative effect at all quantiles suggests that the crowding effect dominates the threat effect. At the same time, the threat effect may be responsible for mitigating the negative wage effect in the lower part of the wage distribution. The finding is also consistent with the presumption that firms in labor market segments with strong unions invest less in capital. This strategy would reduce labor productivity and wages across the entire distribution as a response to an increase in UD. Finally, the fact that the effect of UD is insignificant at the bottom and significantly negative higher up in the wage distribution provides further evidence against the concern of reverse causality in the sense that employees expecting low wages would join a union. If this were the case, we would expect a significantly negative effect of UD at the bottom of the wage distribution.
What do our results reveal concerning the differences between sectoral and firm-specific contracts? Wages are higher on average under firm-specific than under sectoral wage contracts, and this also holds along the wage distribution. While the wage difference between the two contract regimes is quite low at the bottom of the wage distribution, it grows along the wage distribution and is highest at the top (at the 90th percentile the wage gap between an employee covered by a firm-specific contract and an employee covered by a sectoral contract is about 5.5 log points in a firm with 100% coverage, see Table 4 ). As recognition of a sectoral wage contract is basically a firm decision, it is surprising at first glance that firms would not stick to the cheaper sectoral wage contracts.
However, firms may choose firm-specific agreements to respond to the demands of their employees (especially those at the median or the top of the wage distribution). These employees may have the bargaining power to extract higher rents from the firms than possible under sectoral wage contracts, similar to the discussion in Card and de la Rica (2006) . Furthermore, Gürtzgen (2009b) finds that wages paid according to firm-specific contracts have a higher responsiveness to firm profitability than industry-wide contracts.
Firm-level contracts are associated with higher wage inequality among covered workers.
This could be associated with, e. g., higher functional flexibility in exchange for higher wages, something that is sufficiently easy to monitor at the firm level but more difficult to monitor at the sectoral level. Our data do not allow us to test this hypothesis, though.
Conclusions
The design of wage-setting regimes in a large number of OECD countries suggests that researchers should explicitly distinguish between union density and coverage by different Unfortunately, we cannot explicitly take account of the apparent endogeneity of union density and collective coverage, and therefore, strictly speaking, our results should not be interpreted as causal effects. However, we control for different sets of covariates in our regression to assess the effects of selection based on observables. The endogeneity problem is reduced by controlling for both individual and firm characteristics. Our results highlight the importance of using rich linked employer-employee data.
Estimating OLS and quantile regressions of wages, we find that the firm-level share of employees subject to sectoral or firm-specific collective bargaining contracts has a positive impact on the wage level, i. e., firms which adopt a collective contract pay higher wages. This effect is found along the entire wage distribution. Yet, individual bargaining coverage in a covered firm shows a negative impact both on the wage level and on wage dispersion. The negative wage effect of individual coverage is stronger at higher quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. Collective bargaining coverage thus reduces wage inequality. Our findings are in line with the hypothesis that firms apply collective contracts to implement a transparent wage policy. However, a positive premium is paid to workers in a covered firm who are not paid according to a collective contract, i. e., to those who are not covered individually. These workers tend to be higher paid than workers in the same firm with otherwise similar characteristics. Wages of these workers are particularly high in high-wage firms for which the coverage effect is also high, possibly because collective contracts can extract higher rents from these firms. Similar to Card and de la Rica (2006), this effect is even stronger under firm-specific bargaining than under sectoral bargaining.
Having controlled for different coverage effects, we also find significant effects of union density on the wage level and on wage dispersion. A higher union density is associated with lower wages, and the effect is strongest among uncovered individuals and at the top of the wage distribution. At the same time, a higher union density reinforces the positive wage effects of coverage at the firm level. A higher union density also reduces wage dispersion.
This finding is in accordance with an egalitarian wage policy of unions. However, wages in the uncovered sector decline uniformly across the entire wage distribution in response to an increase in union density. This result cannot be rationalized with unions' preference for less wage inequality alone. Instead, it suggests a dominance of crowding effects from the covered sector to the uncovered sector, which are due to an increase in labor supply in the uncovered sector caused by higher wages-and thus lower employment-in the covered sector. The effect may also be due to a decline of firms' capital investment when union density increases. Our analysis does not allow us to distinguish these transmission channels, which should be explored in future research.
In Table 4 .
Tables and Figures to Be Placed in the Text
Panel (A): firm covered by a sectoral contract (SC)
: firm covered by a firm-specific contract (FC)
A Standard Errors for Quantile Regression with Sampling Weights and Clustering
Clustering allows for dependence of observations within clusters (see Froot 1989 , Moulton 1990 , or Williams 2000 . The asymptotic distribution ofβ(τ ) for a given quantile τ in such a setting is
with
and
for observation i in cluster c. N is the total number of observations, and C is the total number of clusters. These expressions, for the case without weights, assume that the model is correctly specified (Angrist et al. 2006) and that correlation of the error term is restricted to pairs of observations within the same cluster. f u denotes the density of the error term (Hendricks and Koenker 1992 , Koenker 2005 , Melly 2006 ).
In contrast to Angrist et al. (2006) , we follow Koenker (1994) for the estimation of the observation-specific density. We use the "Hendricks-Koenker sandwich"
and employ Hall and Sheather's (1988) rule for the bandwidth h N :
where z α satisfies Φ(z α ) = 1 − α/2 for the construction of 1 − α confidence intervals and s(τ ) denotes the sparsity function. 26 As in Koenker (1994) , we use the normal distribution to estimate
In analogy to Angrist et al. (2006) , we take account of sampling weights and clustering at the firm level. We acknowledge that the sampling weights in the GSES are equal for all individuals i = 1, ..., N c within a cluster c. With sampling weights w c normalized to sum up to one, ∑ C c=1 w c = 1, Σ(τ ) and J(τ ) can be estimated consistently bŷ
B Sample Description
The We analyze gross hourly wages including premia. This measure is more appropriate than wages without premia if premia are paid on a regular basis. We impose a lower bound of one Euro for hourly wages.
The GSES 2001 is extended by imputed union density as explained in Section 3.2. Table 6 summarizes the definitions of the collective bargaining and union variables used in this paper, as well as the definitions and summary statistics of individual-level and firm-level covariates. Definitions and descriptives for all variables used in the empirical analysis are reported in the additional online appendix. 
